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The 2019 New York State budget authorizing congestion pricing in New York City
mandates the program begin no earlier than December 31, 2020. Dana Rubinstein,
Why Congestion Pricing Might Be Delayed, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2020/02/14/why-congestion-p
ricing-might-be-delayed-1261628 [https://perma.cc/NP57-AZTC]. Among the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and outside observers, the
“understood goal” for implementation of congestion pricing was January 2021. Id.
However, as of March 2020, delays in the required federal approval processes for
congestion pricing meant that implementation of the program by early 2021 is
unlikely. Id. Worsening relations between New York State and the federal
government have sparked fears that the program may be delayed indefinitely.
Christina Goldbaum & Winnie Hu, Could the Trump Administration Block
Congestion Pricing in New York?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/-trump-congestion-pricing-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/X8A9-KHPG]. Regardless of the eventual implementation date of
congestion pricing in New York, the analysis contained in this Note regarding the
program’s design is likely to remain applicable. The theories contained below can
also be applied to implementations of congestion pricing in other cities around the
United States and the world.
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INTRODUCTION

In the first half of 2017, New York City subway riders were
confronted with a series of increasingly outlandish instances of the
rapid deterioration of the subway system.1 On March 2, a water main
break flooded the Court Street station.2 On May 2, pieces of the
ceiling fell onto a train at the Franklin Avenue stop in Crown
Heights.3 On May 5, a major storm caused waterfalls inside several
stations.4 On May 9, a power outage in Brooklyn led to a cascade of
delays.5 As a result, a woman failed to make it to housing court and
faced eviction.6 A graphic designer lost $100 in wages.7 A

1. See generally Amy Plitt & Zoe Rosenberg, MTA WTF: A Visual Timeline of
MTA’s Epic 2017 Meltdown, CURBED N.Y. (Jul. 17, 2017),
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/6/14/15801694/mta-nyc-subway-delays-twitter
[https://perma.cc/55JF-QV7V].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, ‘Money out of Your Pocket’: New Yorkers Tell of
Subway
Delay
Woes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
31,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/nyregion/money-out-of-your-pocket-new-yorker
s-tell-of-subway-delay-woes.html [https://perma.cc/V4KQ-8NGR].
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psychoanalyst failed to make an appointment with a patient, and the
patient failed to make it too.8
Had they opted to drive instead, these travelers likely would not
have fared much better. An analysis conducted that year by the
traffic analytics company INRIX found that New York City was the
third most traffic-congested city in the world.9 Drivers averaged 91
peak hours stuck in traffic and spent 13% of their time sitting in
congestion.10 Even as a surge of investment over the subsequent two
years has resulted in improved subway conditions,11 traffic congestion
has remained pervasive. Travel speeds in the section of Manhattan
below 60th Street reached a new annual low of just over seven miles
per hour in late 2018.12
In a bid to address these transportation issues, New York State
adopted legislation in 2019 that paved the way for the implementation
of congestion pricing in New York City as soon as January 2021,
allowing the state to toll vehicles driving into Manhattan below 60th
Street.13 Although congestion pricing has successfully reduced traffic
in cities around the globe, New York City is the first city in the
United States to adopt this strategy.14 If successful, congestion
pricing has the potential to alleviate traffic congestion in Manhattan,
reduce harmful carbon dioxide emissions, and raise desperately
needed revenue to fund improvements to the region’s public
transportation infrastructure. However, almost as soon as the
legislature passed its congestion pricing plan into law, advocacy
groups, business interests, and elected officials sought exemptions
from congestion pricing fees. While social and economic concerns
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Ameena Walker, NYC Is the Third Most Traffic Congested City in the World,
N.Y.
(Feb.
6,
2018),
CURBED
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/2/6/16979696/new-york-city-traffic-congestion-second-wor
st [https://perma.cc/JUE7-XQLR].
10. Id.
11. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Why the Subway Is No Longer a Daily Disaster., N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/nyregion/mta-subway-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/2MSU-556Q].
12. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW YORK CITY MOBILITY REPORT 18–19 (2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/mobility-report-singlepage-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VEP3-8PCF].
13. Jesse McKinley & Vivian Wang, New York State Budget Deal Brings
Congestion Pricing, Plastic Bag Ban, and Mansion Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/nyregion/budget-new-york-congestion-pricing.ht
ml?module=inline [https://perma.cc/TV6Y-4NCG].
14. Id.
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may justify certain exemptions, each exemption granted will result in
less traffic reduction, less emissions reduction, and less revenue
raised. The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA),
tasked with implementing New York’s congestion pricing plan, will
have to make difficult decisions regarding who is excluded from or
included in the plan’s tolls.
This Note argues that the concept of transportation equity should
guide the TBTA in determining who receives exemptions from tolling
under New York’s congestion pricing plan. The TBTA should grant
exemptions only if necessary, to preserve congestion pricing’s
effectiveness in minimizing negative transportation-related
externalities, such as congestion and pollution, and in supporting a
system that provides all people with adequate access to transportation
regardless of geography, race, or socioeconomic status. Part I of this
Note provides background on New York City’s transportation crisis,
the theory of congestion pricing, the history of congestion pricing in
other cities, — with a particular focus on London’s congestion pricing
scheme — and New York City’s congestion pricing plan. Part II
examines exemptions to congestion pricing — why they are
important, how they have impacted the effectiveness of congestion
pricing in London, how authorities will determine who receives them
in New York City, which groups are seeking them, and how these
groups may try to obtain them through litigation or legislation. Part
III discusses the concept of transportation equity, proposes and
applies a two-part test for determining which congestion pricing
exemptions advance transportation equity, and suggests alternative
strategies for preserving transportation equity under New York City’s
congestion pricing plan.
I. CONGESTION PRICING IN NEW YORK CITY

Part I examines the path to congestion pricing in New York City.
Section I.A recounts the transportation challenges in New York City
precipitating congestion pricing’s introduction. Section I.B provides
background on how congestion pricing works, while Section I.C
reviews the congestion pricing systems implemented in other cities,
with a special focus on the system used in London. Section I.D
discusses the specifics of New York’s congestion pricing plan,
including its objectives, the mechanisms for tolling vehicles, the
system of allocating revenues, and the plan’s administration.
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A. New York’s Transportation Crisis

In June 2017, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a
state of emergency for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA), the public benefit corporation that runs the New York City
region’s public transportation network.15 The declaration — which
followed several high-profile equipment failures and service
disruptions on the subway — came amid skyrocketing delays and a
growing chorus of rider complaints.16 Since 1991, the subway’s
on-time performance rate had decreased by 26%, even as ridership
increased by 77%.17 With only 65% of trains reaching their
destinations on time, on-time performance was at its lowest rate since
the 1970s transit crisis.18 The New York City subway on-time rate is
now the lowest of any major rapid-transit system in the world.19
In addition to causing New Yorkers frustration,20 the increasing
unreliability of the subway had substantial economic effects for the
15. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New York
Subways,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/nyregion/cuomo-declares-a-state-of-emergency-f
or-the-subway.html [https://perma.cc/4A6Y-AKER] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons,
Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency]; The MTA Network, MTA,
https://new.mta.info/about-us/the-mta-network [https://perma.cc/7KEY-L3TY] (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019). Cuomo’s state of emergency declaration coincided with a
pledge of $1 billion for subway improvements and orders for the MTA Chairman to
provide a reorganization plan for the MTA within 30 days. See Fitzsimmons, Cuomo
Declares a State of Emergency, supra note 15.
16. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency, supra note 15.
17. Brian M. Rosenthal et al., How Politics and Bad Decisions Starved New
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
18,
2017),
York’s
Subways,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/nyregion/new-york-subway-system-failure-delay
s.html [https://perma.cc/HB4H-H27H].
18. In the 1970s and early 1980s, chronic underinvestment in New York City’s
public transportation infrastructure, along with plummeting ridership, brought the
system to the brink of collapse. Derailments, equipment failures, crime, graffiti, and
crumbling facilities plagued the subway and on-time rates dropped below 50%.
MARK SEAMAN ET AL., RUDIN CTR. FOR TRANSP. POLICY & MGMT., FROM RESCUE TO
RENAISSANCE: THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MTA CAPITAL PROGRAM 1982–2004 1–3
(2004). For a snapshot of conditions at the outset of this crisis, see Thomas R.
Brooks, Subway Roulette: The Game Is Getting Dangerous, N.Y. MAG., June 15,
1970,
at
41,
https://books.google.com/books?id=_-ICAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=
may+20,+1970+nyc+subway+crash&hl=en#v=onepage&q=may%2020%2C%201970
%20nyc%20subway%20crash&f=false [https://perma.cc/Y7K8-VP87].
19. Rosenthal et al., supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., Subway Service Close to Normal, but Power Outage Cause
Unknown,
WABC-TV
(Apr.
21,
2017),
https://abc7ny.com/traffic/subway-service-close-to-normal-but-outage-cause-unknow
n/1899411/ [https://perma.cc/978S-58N4]; CBS N.Y., Another Day, Another Signal
Problem
on
the
Subway,
YOUTUBE
(June
14,
2017),

City
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city and its residents. A 2017 analysis by New York City Comptroller
Scott Stringer estimated the annual cost of subway delays could be as
high as $389 million.21 The causes of the subway’s declining
performance were multifaceted: natural disasters, bureaucracy, and
mismanagement all contributed to the system’s struggles,22 but the
primary driver of the subway’s decline was underinvestment.23
Amidst surging ridership and increasing city and state revenues,
beginning in the early 1990s, government investment in the subways
declined as city and state officials diverted a combined $1.5 billion
from the MTA.24 While Governor Cuomo’s emergency declaration
was followed by the implementation of an $800 million dollar
short-term rescue plan for the subway,25 officials estimate a
comprehensive plan to upgrade the subway’s outdated signal system
would cost up to $19 billion over the first five years.26
Above ground, New Yorkers have experienced a transportation
crisis of a different sort — traffic congestion. Between 2010 and 2017,
steadily increasing population, employment, and tourism combined to
increase travel demand in New York City.27 Motorists below 60th
Street — an area including the city’s commercial core — have acutely
felt the effects of this increased demand.28 Although the number of

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9L5MAVwB4XQ [https://perma.cc/HC57-P6CT];
CBS N.Y., Power Problem Cause More Subway Delays, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7RmACOG4uM
[https://perma.cc/A8GE-MK69].
21. The Economic Cost of Subway Delays, OFF. N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER (Oct. 1,
2017),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-economic-cost-of-subway-delays/
[https://perma.cc/R8HQ-FAYQ].
22. See generally Rosenthal, Fitzsimmons & LaForgia, supra note 17. The long
list of factors contributing to the MTA’s poor financial state includes not just
disasters, such as the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Sandy, but also poor
financial decisions, such as a “debt bomb” refinancing deal Governor George Pataki
pushed, and diversions of funds to other sources, such as when Governor Andrew
Cuomo redirected $5 million of MTA funds to bail out upstate ski resorts struggling
after a warm winter in 2016. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Sweeping Plan to Fix the Subways Comes with a
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
22,
2018),
$19
Billion
Price
Tag,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/nyregion/nyc-subway-byford-proposal.html
[https://perma.cc/GT5V-N29J].
26. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, M.T.A. Plan to Upgrade Subways Is Ambitious. But
Is
It
Even
Possible?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/nyregion/subway-signal-upgrade-plan.html
[https://perma.cc/TE7V-HTS3].
27. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 12, at 10–11.
28. Id. at 18.
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vehicles entering this portion of the city decreased from 776,000 to
709,000 per day during this period, average automobile travel speed
fell from 9.1 to 7.1 miles per hour.29 Two factors driving congestion
are the skyrocketing number of trips made by for-hire vehicles30 and
an increase in freight traffic and home deliveries.31 Like delays in the
subway system, traffic congestion imposes a quantifiable economic
cost on New Yorkers. A 2018 analysis by the business advocacy
group Partnership for New York City estimated that traffic
congestion costs the New York City region about $20 billion
annually,32 meaning that, for the average commuter entering
Manhattan, the cost is $1892 per year.33 Facing the dual crises of
declining subway performance and increasing traffic congestion,
Governor Cuomo voiced support for a solution that advocates
believed could help solve both problems — a congestion pricing plan
requiring drivers to pay a fee to enter lower Manhattan.34
B. Basics of Congestion Pricing

Congestion pricing is a pricing strategy that aims to regulate
demand by increasing costs without increasing supply.35 Congestion

29. Id. at 12–13.
30. The number of citywide for-hire vehicle trips increased from approximately
168.9 million in 2010 to 315.9 million in 2017. Id. The number of taxi and for-hire
vehicle registrations increased from approximately 41,200 in 2010 to 100,700 in 2017.

Id.

31. The annual number of MTA Bridge & Tunnel and Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey freight trips increased from approximately 32.9 million in 2010
to 34.6 million in 2017. Id. Almost 45% of New Yorkers receive a home delivery at
least once per week. Amy Plitt & Valeria Ricciulli, New York City’s Streets Are
‘More Congested Than Ever’: Report, CURBED N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/8/15/20807470/nyc-streets-dot-mobility-report-congestion
[https://perma.cc/GKK7-3QL6].
32. $100 Billion Cost of Traffic Congestion in Metro New York, PARTNERSHIP
FOR
N.Y.C.
(2018),
https://pfnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-01-Congestion-Pricing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63D5-A6YE]. Of this figure, $9.17 billion is attributable to
increased travel time cost, $5.85 billion to revenue loss by industry, $2.54 billion to
excess fuel and vehicle operating costs, and $2.42 billion to increases in operating
costs by industry. Id.
33. Id.
34. Marc Santora, Cuomo Calls Manhattan Traffic Plan an Idea ‘Whose Time Has
Come’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/nyregion/cuomo-rethinks-opposition-to-tolls-toease-manhattan-traffic.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/4ZHN-ADU3].
35. Carla Tardi, Congestion Pricing, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 9, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/congestion-pricing.asp
[https://perma.cc/7QGD-NBER].
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pricing is used by certain sectors — like the hotel and utility industries
— where demand varies depending on physical location, time of day,
or time of year.36 For example, hotel rooms may be more expensive
during major holiday travel periods and electricity rates may be
higher during the summer because of increased air conditioner
usage.37 Congestion pricing forces individuals to account for the costs
of using a resource in a time or place where the resource is in high
demand by charging those individuals extra fees.38
In the context of automobile traffic, congestion pricing incentivizes
drivers to shift discretionary automobile travel to other modes of
transportation or to off-peak periods by imposing a cost for driving in
high-traffic areas or during high-traffic periods.39 While allowing
governments to raise revenue that can be redirected towards mass
transit or other projects, congestion pricing also benefits the public by
reducing automobile travel times, fuel consumption, and emissions.40
Several traffic pricing strategies are included under the umbrella of
congestion pricing — including variably priced express lanes, roadway
tolls, and area-wide per-mile driving charges — but proposals for New
York involve a cordon pricing strategy where drivers are charged a
flat fee for entering a specific area, that is, below 60th Street in
Manhattan.41 Initial studies of potential congestion pricing plans in
New York City indicated congestion pricing could raise over $1
billion annually for improving public transportation in the region.42

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CONGESTION PRICING: A
PRIMER
1
(2006)
[hereinafter
FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.,
PRIMER],
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestionpricing/congestionpricing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P6ZS-4KX5] .
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 1; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1704-A (McKinney 2019).
42. See, e.g., Justin Davidson, Why You Should Be in Favor of Congestion
Pricing
in
New
York,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Mar.
27,
2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/all-the-arguments-against-congestion-pricingrefuted.html [https://perma.cc/6XUW-63XH]; Benjamin Kabak, Amid Political
Bickering, a Progressive Solution to NYC’s Transit Crisis Waits in the Wings,
N.Y.
(Aug.
1,
2018),
CURBED
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/8/1/17631480/nyc-subway-transit-crisis-congestion-pricingprogressive [https://perma.cc/4UTV-TLJD]; Charles Komanoff, The Fix NYC
Congestion Pricing Plan Looks Solid — If Cuomo Aims High, STREETSBLOG NYC
(Jan.
23,
2018),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2018/01/23/the-fix-nyc-congestion-pricing-plan-looks-solidif-cuomo-aims-high/ [https://perma.cc/9G4R-YSC7] [hereinafter Komanoff, The Fix
NYC].
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By discouraging drivers from entering Manhattan via automobiles,
congestion pricing could also help increase traffic speeds by as much
as 10%.43
C. Congestion Pricing outside the United States

The effective implementation of congestion pricing in cities outside
the United States has bolstered arguments in favor of congestion
pricing in New York City.44 In 1975, Singapore began charging
drivers to enter a two square mile “restricted zone” in its central
business district during morning peak hours.45 This charge on
Singaporean drivers resulted in a 76% reduction in private car usage
within the central business district and a doubling of bus usage.46 The
Italian city of Milan,47 the Swedish cities of Gothenburg and
Stockholm,48 and other European cities such as Durham, England
and Znojmo, Czech Republic49 have also introduced cordon-style
congestion pricing schemes.
These congestion pricing

43. Komanoff, The Fix NYC, supra note 42.
44. Jesse McKinley & Winnie Hu, Congestion Pricing in Manhattan, First Such
Plan in U.S., Is Close to Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/nyregion/congestion-pricing-nyc.html?module=i
nline [https://perma.cc/2FAK-WXYY].
45. KIRAN BHATT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LESSONS LEARNED FROM
INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE
IN
CONGESTION
PRICING
2-1
(2008),
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop08047/Intl_CPLessons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VX5-K666]; Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads:
Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 917 (2010). For comparison, New York City’s central
business district has an area of approximately nine square miles. Press Release,
Metro. Transp. Auth., MTA Announces Selection of TransCore to Build
Nation-Leading Central Business District Tolling System (Oct. 18, 2019),
http://www.mta.info/press-release/bridges-tunnels/mta-announces-selection-transcore
-build-nation-leading-central [https://perma.cc/N4PV-WDU7].
46. Iaione, supra note 45, at 918. As Singapore has expanded its congestion
pricing system over the years, results have remained strong. While the sizable
immediate effects have diminished somewhat, congestion remained 31% below
pre-plan levels as of 2010, despite a 77% increase in the number of cars in the city. Id.
47. Id. at 922. The primary stated goals of Milan’s plan, which began in 2008, were
to reduce emissions and improve air quality. Id.
48. Congestion Taxes in Stockholm and Gothenburg, TRANSPORT STYRELSEN
(Oct.
2,
2017),
https://transportstyrelsen.se/en/road/Congestion-taxes-in-Stockholm-and-Goteborg/
[https://perma.cc/G42L-2RKR].
49. See NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, MAKING SPACE:
CONGESTION
PRICING
IN
CITIES
17
(2019),
https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/CSAR_ConjestionPricingReport_Final
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD54-3PJX].
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implementations demonstrate the success of cordon-style congestion
pricing schemes across a range of urban areas.
The largest city to implement congestion pricing50 — and the city
most similar to New York in terms of population size and economic
and cultural diversity51 — is London. Like New York, London has a
robust and complex transportation network that includes subways,
commuter rail, ferries, and an extensive bus system.52 London has
Before the
also suffered from severe traffic congestion.53
introduction of congestion pricing in 2003, London had an average
automobile speed of only 7.5 miles per hour in the city center and was
losing between $3 to $6 million a week as a consequence of gridlock.54
Broad public acknowledgment of the traffic congestion problem and
Mayor Ken Livingstone’s strong commitment to congestion pricing
hastened congestion pricing’s passage into law.55
London’s congestion pricing system — administered by the city’s
transit agency, Transport for London (TfL) — charges drivers a flat
daily fee to enter a 16 square mile area in the city center between 7:00
a.m. and 6:00 p.m Monday through Friday.56 The system utilizes an
extensive camera network to charge zone entrants using automatic
license plate recognition.57 The charge for entering the zone was £5
($6.41 USD)58 in 2003 and has been raised several times, reaching the
current rate of £11.50 ($14.74 USD) in 2014.59 The goals of London’s

50. EMILY PROVONSHA & NICKOLAS SIFUENTES, TRI-STATE TRANSP. CAMPAIGN,
ROAD PRICING IN LONDON, STOCKHOLM AND SINGAPORE: A WAY FORWARD FOR
NEW
YORK
CITY
4
(2018),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/TSTC_A_Way_Forward_CPr
eport_1.4.18_medium.pdf [https://perma.cc/GND3-FA78].
51. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 6.
52. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 6.
53. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 6.
54. Id.
55. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 7. At the time of the scheme’s
implementation, 90% of London residents believed there was too much traffic and
expressed concerns about travel time and air pollution. Id.
56. Id.; BHATT, HIGGINS & BERG, supra note 45, at 2-12.
57. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 7. Cameras mounted at all zone
entry points photograph the license plates of entering vehicles. Drivers can pay by
telephone, text message, online, or mail. If authorities do not receive payment by
midnight on the day after travel, drivers receive a fine of £130 ($166.66 USD). Id.
58. This currency conversion, and all subsequent currency conversions in this
Note, were conducted on February 29, 2020, using the Google Finance currency
conversion tool. For more information, see Finance Data Listing and Disclaimers,
GOOGLE
FIN.,
https://www.google.com/googlefinance/disclaimer/
[https://perma.cc/9PPG-WHXG] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
59. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 8.
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congestion pricing system include reducing automobile congestion,
improving bus service, improving journey-time reliability for car trips,
and improving the efficiency of the distribution of goods and
services.60 The scheme required a $214 million initial investment and
has annual operating costs of roughly $172 million.61 Annual net
revenue is roughly $182 million.62
London’s system has provided an array of benefits to the city.
Approximately $1.8 billion in net revenue was invested in public
transportation, road and bridge improvement, walking, and cycling
projects between 2003 and 2013.63 By 2004, traffic congestion had
decreased by 30%, and automobile speeds in the congestion zone had
increased by 30%.64 Public transportation usage surged, with bus
ridership reaching a 50-year high in 2011.65 Pollution decreased,66
lowering the risk of health issues such as asthma, bronchitis, and heart
attacks for city residents.67 One study estimated that more than 1888
extra years of life had been saved for London’s residents as a result of
cleaner air.68
However, implementation of congestion pricing has not solved all
the transportation problems in London. Traffic congestion has once
again begun to tick upwards in recent years69 — a trend attributed
both to increases in the amount of road capacity devoted to buses,
cyclists, and pedestrians,70 as well as to an increase in the number of
for-hire vehicles.71 Furthermore, revenues from congestion pricing
made up only 8.5% of revenues for TfL between 2014 and 2015.72 In
April 2019, London introduced a separate congestion fee to combat

60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. The annual operating cost of London’s system takes up almost half of the
system’s gross revenue. Id. In Stockholm (7%) and Singapore (16%), the proportion
of gross revenue used on operating costs is significantly lower. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. From 2002–2003, carbon dioxide emissions declined by 16%, nitrogen oxide
emissions by 13.5%, and particulate matter by 15.5%. Id. at 9.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Nicole Badstuber, London’s Congestion Charge Is Showing Its Age, CITYLAB
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/04/londons-congestion-charge-needs-up
dating/557699/ [https://perma.cc/8NJY-PGSQ].
72. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7.
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the still-persistent air pollution problem.73
Even with these
challenges, London provides a case study for how a congestion pricing
plan can help solve a variety of transportation, health, and
infrastructure challenges in the urban core of a large city like New
York.
D. New York’s Central Business District Tolling Program

Despite the success of congestion pricing in London and other
cities around the world, early efforts to implement congestion pricing
in New York City were met with resistance from business, labor, and
political interests.74 The New York congestion pricing plan passed
into law in 2019 follows a decades-long history of attempts to regulate
traffic in the city through pricing.75 Previous congestion pricing plans
for New York City had been defeated in court,76 been fatally limited
in scope,77 withered in the face of political backlash,78 or failed to gain

73. Ultra
Low
Emission
Zone
(ULEZ),
CITY
OF
LONDON,
https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/environmental-health/environmental-prote
ction/air-quality/Pages/ultra-low-emission-zone.aspx [https://perma.cc/RP7Z-27BF]
(last visited Apr. 2, 2020). The new £12.50 ($16.03 USD) fee will be applied daily to
vehicles entering the city center that fall short of established emissions standards. Id.
Unlike the existing congestion pricing charge, this new fee will be charged 24/7. Id. A
driver entering the congestion zone during a weekday may be charged both fees, for a
total of £24 ($30.77 USD). Id. Authorities plan to extend the new fee to cover an
even greater area beginning in 2021. Id.
74. Groups that opposed previous congestion pricing plans include the taxi,
trucking, tourism, hotel, entertainment, hospital, and parking garage industries, as
well as the labor union the Teamsters. Aaron Naparstek, Congestion Charging in
New York City: The Political Bloodbath, STREETSBLOG NYC (Dec. 4, 2006),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2006/12/04/congestion-charging-in-new-york-city-the-politi
cal-bloodbath/ [https://perma.cc/KF9K-LVJ8] (chronicling the decades-long history
of opposition to attempts to toll drivers entering Manhattan); see also Nicholas
Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee for Manhattan Gets Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/nyregion/08congest.html
[https://perma.cc/BCJ2-FMZM] (regarding the collapse of New York City Mayor
Michael R. Bloomberg’s 2008 congestion pricing proposal amidst strong opposition
from state legislators representing Brooklyn, Queens, and New York City suburbs).
75. Iaione, supra note 45, at 919.
76. Auto. Club of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 1981 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3518
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). This was the fate of two separate plans proposed by Mayor Ed
Koch in the 1980s. Iaione, supra note 45, at 919.
77. A 2000 congestion pricing scheme for several city bridges and tunnels had
minimal impact on traffic congestion. Observers have suggested the poor results were
due to the marginal nature of the toll increases during peak periods and the lack of
alternatives to using the tolled facilities. See Iaione, supra note 45, at 919.
78. This was the fate of a 2005 cordon pricing proposal from Mayor Bloomberg’s
Administration. Id. at 920.
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necessary support in the New York State Legislature.79 As late as
December 2017, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio continued to
oppose congestion pricing, asserting that the strategy was regressive
and would unfairly burden low-income New Yorkers and
outer-borough residents.80 Mayor de Blasio — along with a majority
of the New York City Council — advocated raising funds for subway
improvements through a “millionaire’s tax” on individuals earning
more than $500,000 annually.81
Finally, in March 2019, the New York State Legislature authorized
a cordon-style congestion pricing plan for lower Manhattan as part of
the state budget.82 Support from Governor Cuomo and a change in
position from Mayor de Blasio — who came to agree the strategy was
essential for funding New York City’s subway system — helped
ensure the plan’s passage.83 New York’s plan has three major goals:
reducing the volume of Manhattan traffic, reducing air pollution, and
securing funding for the region’s public transit system.84 In passing
the plan, the state legislature specifically declared a “long-term and

79. A non-vote in the state assembly defeated a second Bloomberg
Administration cordon pricing plan. Strong opposition from some state lawmakers
contributed to this defeat, despite an extensive review by a joint panel of city and
state experts and the availability of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding.
Id. at 921.
80. Brad Aaron, De Blasio’s Wrong: There’s a Fair Congestion Pricing Plan Right
STREETSBLOG
NYC
(Dec.
1,
2017),
under
His
Nose,
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2017/12/01/de-blasios-wrong-theres-a-fair-congestion-prici
ng-plan-right-under-his-nose/ [https://perma.cc/37JU-HSRA]. Studies by the
advocacy group Community Service Society contradicted Mayor de Blasio’s claim
that congestion pricing would function as a regressive tax that would
disproportionately burden outer-borough residents. Id.
81. Zoe Rosenberg, De Blasio’s Proposed Millionaire’s Tax Backed by More
CURBED
N.Y.
(Oct.
26,
2017),
Than
Half
of
City
Council,
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/10/26/16552712/millionaires-tax-bill-de-blasio-fair-fix
[https://perma.cc/JB98-ETLS]. While a millionaire’s tax would serve as a progressive
means of raising revenue, it would fail to address the negative externalities resulting
from traffic congestion including noise pollution, air pollution, and increased travel
times.
82. McKinley & Wang, supra note 13.
83. David Meyer, Breaking: Mayor de Blasio Endorses Congestion Pricing as Part
of Cuomo MTA Takeover, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/02/26/breaking-mayor-de-blasio-endorses-congestionpricing-as-part-of-cuomo-mta-takeover/ [https://perma.cc/NSH8-GJYD].
84. Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New York’s New Congestion
Pricing
Law,
N.Y.L.J.
(May
8,
2019),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/05/08/new-yorks-new-congestion-prici
ng-law/ [https://perma.cc/35EY-KJS2].
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sustainable solution” was necessary “to ensure stable and reliable
funding to repair and revitalize” New York City’s subway system.85
The 2019 New York State budget establishes a “central business
district tolling program” (CBDTP) to be administered by the
TBTA.86 The central business district (CBD) is defined as the area in
Manhattan from 60th Street southward, excluding the FDR Drive and
the West Side Highway.87 This nine square mile area is the largest
employment center in the region, housing 2 million jobs, 450 million
square feet of office space, and 600,000 residents.88 Approximately
880,000 people drive into the CBD every day.89 Under the CBDTP,
the TBTA has the power to establish and collect tolls and fees from
vehicles entering or remaining in the CBD at any time.90 Passenger
vehicles may only be charged once per day.91 In addition to laying
out the basic parameters of this plan, the state legislature also made
plans to establish a permanent infrastructure to manage and
administer the new CBDTP.
Under the new congestion pricing plan, the TBTA must ensure
that annual revenues from the CBDTP, minus costs, are sufficient to
provide at least $15 billion for capital projects in the 2020–2024 MTA
Capital Program.92 Subject to agreements with bondholders and
federal law, remaining revenues from the CBDTP after covering the
program’s operating costs must go towards MTA capital
expenditures, with 80% designated for the New York City Transit
Authority (which runs the city’s subway and bus systems), 10%
designated for the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), and 10%
designated for the Metro North Commuter Railroad.93 Infrastructure
for the tolling system is to be planned, designed, installed, and
operated by the TBTA in coordination with the New York City

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1701 (McKinney 2019).

Id. § 1704 (McKinney 2019).
Id.

Press Release, Metro. Transp. Auth., supra note 45.
Emma G. Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing. New
Jersey
Wants
Revenge.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/nyregion/congestion-pricing-new-jersey.html
[https://perma.cc/5UWE-GKAG] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting
Congestion Pricing].
90. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1704-A (McKinney 2019).
91. Id. Notably, this leaves the door open for the TBTA to charge trucks and
other non-passenger vehicles more than once per day.
92. Id.
93. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 553-j (McKinney 2019).
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Department of Transportation.94 The state budget requires the
TBTA establish a six-person Traffic Mobility Review Board (TMRB)
to conduct studies related to the CBDTP and determine toll
amounts.95 The Mayor of New York City is to recommend one of the
TMRB’s members, and one member shall come from each of the
LIRR and Metro North service areas.96 With this basic framework
and administration outlined by the state legislature, the TBTA and
TMRB now must consider a critical element of this new plan:
exemptions.
II. THE PROVISION OF EXEMPTIONS UNDER NEW YORK'S CENTRAL
BUSINESS DISTRICT TOLLING PROGRAM

Part II discusses the factors influencing provision of exemptions
under the CBDTP. Section II.A explains why limiting exemptions is
essential for preserving the effectiveness of the CBDTP in achieving
its stated goals. Section II.B examines the present exemptions under
London’s congestion pricing plan and considers what lessons New
York can learn from the London model. Section II.C lays out the
procedures the TBTA will use to determine exemptions under the
CBDTP.
Section II.D surveys the numerous groups seeking
exemptions under the CBDTP and examines their arguments. Lastly,
Section II.E speculates how these groups may seek to obtain
exemptions through litigation or legislation.
A. The Importance of Limiting Exemptions in a Congestion Pricing
System

Effectively implementing congestion pricing in New York will
highly depend on tolling, exemptions, and other design aspects of the
CBDTP.97 Pressure to provide exemptions is likely to be high,
especially considering the lukewarm initial public response to the
CBDTP. A Quinnipiac poll from April 2019 found that 54% of New
Yorkers oppose the plan, and 52% have expressed skepticism about
the plan’s effectiveness in reducing traffic.98 Because the CBDTP’s

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Gerrard & McTiernan, supra note 84.

Id.
Id.

DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 13.
Congestion Pricing Won’t Work, New Yorkers Say, Quinnipiac University
Poll Finds; Voters Say Scrap Elite School Test, Increase Diversity, QUINNIPIAC U.

POLL
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https://poll.qu.edu/new-york-city/release-detail?ReleaseID=2612
[https://perma.cc/Q7PQ-UH8X]. This mirrors initial public opinion towards
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authorizing legislation requires the program to raise a set amount of
revenue, provision of exemptions will necessarily result in higher
tolls.99 Even without an established revenue threshold, experts warn
excessive exemptions would damage the congestion and emissions
benefits of the CBDTP.100
Transportation experts and advocates have been vocal about
limiting the number of exemptions. Transportation engineer and
former New York City Traffic Commissioner Sam Schwartz,101 one of
the New York congestion pricing plan’s authors, argues there should
be “just about no exemptions” because “[p]eople using their cars
contribute to congestion. It doesn’t matter what group they belong
to.”102 Transit economist Charles Komanoff notes congestion pricing
rests upon the principle that all vehicles contributing to congestion
should pay a price to mitigate its effects.103 By undermining this
principle, Komanoff worries excessive exemptions would breed public
resentment of congestion pricing and erode compliance.104 Using a
sample congestion pricing plan that Governor Cuomo’s Fix NYC
Advisory Panel proposed,105 Komanoff conducted an analysis of how
exemptions for 10% of rides would affect the impacts of congestion

congestion pricing in other cities that have implemented congestion pricing. In many
cases, public opinion shifted favorably once governments implemented their plans
and the benefits of the plans were realized. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 15.
99. Traffic expert Sam Schwartz, one of the architects of New York’s congestion
pricing plan, notes that too many exemptions could push tolls to over $15. Emma G.
Fitzsimmons & Winnie Hu, Congestion Pricing Is Coming. Now Everyone Wants a
Break.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/nyregion/congestion-pricing-trucks-new-jersey.h
tml?module=inline [https://perma.cc/YTP6-3NZT].
100. Charles Komanoff, Komanoff: Congestion Pricing Carveouts Will Steal
Millions of Hours and Billions of Bucks, STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/03/28/komanoff-congestion-pricing-carveouts-will-ste
al-millions-of-hours-and-billions-of-bucks/
[https://perma.cc/LQ4R-QLJ5]
[hereinafter Komanoff, Congestion Pricing Carveouts].
101. Samuel
I.
Schwartz,
PE,
SAM
SCHWARTZ,
https://www.samschwartz.com/leadership-samuel-i-schwartz
[https://perma.cc/6593-Y7EX] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
102. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
103. Komanoff, Congestion Pricing Carveouts, supra note 100.
104. Id. Administration of exemptions would also impose additional bureaucratic
costs. Id.
105. The Governor convened this panel, comprised of elected officials, business
and labor leaders, and transportation experts and advocates, in October 2017 to
advise the state on proposals for funding mass transit improvements and reducing
traffic congestion. Governor Cuomo Announces “Fix NYC” Advisory Panel, N.Y.
STATE
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-fix-nyc-advisory-pane
l [https://perma.cc/SFZ2-A9MR].
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pricing.106 He found net annual revenues for investment into the
transit system would shrink by $100 million,107 travel time savings for
drivers would shrink by 7%, and 44,000 hours a day of combined time
savings and $300 million per year in net benefits from congestion
pricing would be lost.108 Komanoff’s analysis indicates how excessive
exemptions under the CBDTP could curtail the program’s
effectiveness at raising revenue for public transportation and
combating negative externalities stemming from congestion.
B. Discounts and Exemptions under London’s Congestion Pricing
Scheme

The congestion pricing system in London can provide lessons for
New York regarding how to manage exemptions to congestion
pricing. London’s congestion pricing system provides discounts and
exemptions for a variety of vehicles.109 Registered residents of the
congestion zone in London receive a 90% discount on the congestion
charge.110 Full exemptions from the charge are provided for
emergency service vehicles, National Health Service vehicles, vehicles
used by people with disabilities, vehicles with nine or more seats,
two-wheeled motorbikes and motor tricycles, tow trucks and roadside
recovery vehicles, and vehicles used by certain government agencies
including the armed forces and the Royal Parks Agency.111 These
exemptions existed from the beginning of the London congestion
pricing scheme, and TfL has supplemented these exemptions with
other specialized exemptions.
TfL has further implemented two large exemptions over the course
of the scheme’s history. The first exemption is the “Greener Vehicle

106. Komanoff, Congestion Pricing Carveouts, supra note 100.
107. Id. The cost of outfitting a subway line with modern signals is approximately
$1.2 billion. Id.
108. Id. A report issued by the Regional Plan Association (RPA), a civic
organization focused on regional planning in the New York metropolitan area,
echoes Schwartz’s and Komanoff’s warnings about exemptions. According to the
RPA, “[a]ny discounts or exemptions granted to particular classes of users will erode
the revenue and congestion mitigation impacts of the program, and increase the
burden on non-exempt users.” CHRISTOPHER JONES ET AL., REG’L PLAN ASS’N,
CONGESTION
PRICING
IN
NYC:
GETTING
IT
RIGHT
17
(2019),
http://library.rpa.org/pdf/RPA-CongestionPricingNYC_GettingItRight.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BQZ-DQU3].
109. Discounts
and
Exemptions,
TRANSPORT
FOR
LONDON,
https://tfl.gov.uk/modes/driving/congestion-charge/discounts-and-exemptions
[https://perma.cc/6U2G-J8Y3] (last visited Jan. 15, 2020).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Discount” that originally exempted vehicles emitting less than
100g/km of carbon dioxide from the congestion pricing fee.112 In
2013, this discount was replaced with the “Ultra Low Emission
Discount,” which imposed even stricter fuel efficiency standards.113
By 2021, only zero-emission vehicles will be exempt from congestion
pricing fees, and TfL will eliminate the discount entirely at the end of
2025.114 In April 2019, London introduced a new, 24/7 Ultra Low
Emission Zone coterminous with the congestion pricing zone.115
Vehicles entering this zone that do not meet fuel efficiency standards
are now charged a separate fee that is, if necessary, added onto the
weekday congestion pricing fee.116
Another shifting exemption under London’s congestion pricing
scheme involves taxis and for-hire vehicles. Initially, all for-hire
vehicles were exempt from London’s congestion charges.117
However, as ride sharing services, such as Uber, grew in popularity
inside the congestion zone, these vehicles began to affect the
congestion pricing scheme’s effectiveness, contributing to longer
travel times and increased congestion.118 In 2019, the exemption for
private for-hire taxi operators was eliminated, although London’s
famous black cabs retained their exemption.119 The histories of
London’s low emissions vehicle and for-hire vehicle exemptions
demonstrate the need for congestion pricing plans to be flexible in
adapting to changing conditions and technology, and to take a hard

112. Jessica Shankleman, London Tightens up Congestion Charge in Attempt to
out
Diesel,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
24,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/apr/24/pollution
[https://perma.cc/6GKQ-3TLV].
113. Id.
114. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7.
115. Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), supra note 73.
116. Id.
117. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7.
118. Id.
119. Costas Pitas, Uber and Other Taxi Firms to Pay London Congestion Charge,
(Dec.
19,
2018),
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-taxi/uber-and-other-taxi-firms-to-pay-lond
on-congestion-charge-idUSKBN1OI14H [https://perma.cc/7D2L-TYKB]. Black cabs
are also exempt from paying to enter the new ultra-low emission zone. Gwyn
Topham, London Prepares for Launch of Ultra-Low Emissions Zone, GUARDIAN
(Apr.
6,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/apr/06/london-prepares-for-launch-of-ult
ra-low-emissions-zone [https://perma.cc/EJL3-3GX2].
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stance against exemptions that threaten a congestion pricing plan’s
effectiveness.120
C. Approved Exemptions under New York’s Central Business
District Tolling Program

The New York City CBDTP’s authorizing legislation mandates two
broad classes of exemption. First, emergency vehicles and vehicles
carrying persons with disabilities will not be tolled under the
CBDTP.121 A statement by Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio
suggests this exemption is intended to extend to “individuals who
have an identifiable hardship or limited ability to access medical
facilities in the CBD.”122 Second, CBD residents with annual incomes
less than $60,000 will receive a tax credit offsetting their amount paid
under the CBDTP.123 The TBTA is authorized to provide additional
credits, discounts, and exemptions under the CBDTP upon the
TMRB’s recommendation or on the basis of a traffic study that
considers impact.124 The TBTA is also specifically tasked with
implementing a plan addressing credits, discounts, and exemptions for
for-hire vehicles, informed by the TMRB’s recommendations.125

120. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7; Bobby Cuza, London’s Experience with
Congestion Pricing: It’s Working!, STREETSBLOG NYC (May 31, 2019),

https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/05/31/london-on-congestion-pricing-its-awesome/
[https://perma.cc/AR62-JQ4X].
121. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1704-A (McKinney 2019).
122. Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio and Governor
Cuomo Announce 10 Point Plan to Transform and Fund the MTA (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/111-19/mayor-de-blasio-governor-cuo
mo-10-point-plan-transform-fund-mta?fbclid=IwAR0y1WP-HtEQNMnMOkQR6kf7
ZTmKIr3DoSLmgWMjuA9H8yOhumgZIlV-5Bw [https://perma.cc/FLC8-AAZS].
123. JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 4.
124. Id.
125. Id. These vehicles — taxis, green cabs, limousines, black cars, livery vehicles,
rideshare vehicles, and pool vehicles — are already subject to a separate congestion
surcharge. Congestion Surcharge, N.Y. ST. DEP’T TAX’N & FIN. (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/cs/csidx.htm
[https://perma.cc/8UUJ-QGUT].
This
surcharge, which went into effect on February 2, 2019, imposes an additional cost
($2.50 for medallion taxicabs, $2.75 for other for-hire transportation trips, and $0.75
for pool rides) on all for-hire trips beginning in, ending in, or passing through
Manhattan below 96th Street. Id. The New York State Legislature passed the fee — a
precursor to the more extensive CBDTP — in 2018, but it was delayed by an
unsuccessful lawsuit from the taxi industry. Like the CBDTP, the state legislature
intended the fee to raise money for the subway system. Winnie Hu, Your Taxi or
Uber Ride in Manhattan Will Soon Cost More, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/nyregion/uber-taxi-lyft-fee.html
[https://perma.cc/W687-4TRJ].
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D. Groups Seeking Exemptions

Numerous interest groups are seeking, or are expected to seek,
exemptions under the CBDTP.
These include labor groups
concerned that new congestion fees will disproportionately impact
their workers and jeopardize their livelihoods, industry groups
worried about the effects of new expenses on their bottom lines,
motorcycle and low-emissions vehicle owners who believe they are
inappropriate targets for a program intended to address congestion
and emissions, and politicians fighting to protect their constituents
from a new government-imposed cost.126 Because New York State
lawmakers intentionally left language regarding exemptions vague in
the legislation authorizing the CBDTP, groups seeking exemptions
have engaged in behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts to influence the
TMRB and TBTA’s decision-making processes, as well as overt
efforts to sway public opinion.127 Should these efforts fail, these
groups may turn to the court system or seek additional legislation to
codify exemptions for themselves.
One group that has been particularly vocal about expressing their
desire for an exemption is New York City Police Department officers
and personnel. Patrick J. Lynch, President of the New York City
Police Benevolent Association, argues that police officers should
receive an exemption because they require “the greatest possible
According to Lynch, the
flexibility” in getting to work.128
unpredictability of hours and work locations for officers and their
need to respond rapidly in emergency situations, often to locations
poorly served by mass transit, makes driving into the CBD
unavoidable.129 Lynch suggests an exemption for police officers and
other public employees in critical roles is necessary in addition to the

126. See generally Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
127. Id.
128. Patrick J. Lynch, Exempt Cops from Congestion Fees: Police Officers Work
Odd Hours, and They Don’t Choose Where They’re Posted, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8,
2019),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-exempt-cops-from-congestion-fees-20
190408-pj2ebsx2njdibiud7etso6wuma-story.html [https://perma.cc/W8A3-8SUJ].
129. Id. Lynch’s call for a police exemption was met with strong opposition from
advocacy groups, including Riders Alliance, Transportation Alternatives, and the
RPA, as well as at least one state legislator. Gersh Kuntzman, Transit Advocates
Strongly Oppose NYPD Congestion Pricing Carveout, STREETSBLOG NYC (Apr. 8,
2019), https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/04/08/transit-advocates-strongly-oppose-nypdcongestion-pricing-carveout/ [https://perma.cc/3HXN-6PAY]. These opponents argue
that the commuting challenges faced by police personnel are not meaningfully
different from those faced by thousands of other workers, and that a carve-out would
undermine the effectiveness of the CBDTP. Id.
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exemption for emergency vehicles because “those vehicles don’t run
unless first responders are able to get to work.”130
Another faction seeking exemption from the proposed CBDTP is
the taxi and car service industry.131 Taxis and car services are already
subject to a surcharge ($2.50 for medallion taxicabs, $2.75 for other
for-hire transportation trips, and $0.75 per pool ride) that operators
must add to the price of any trip beginning in, ending in, or passing
through the area of Manhattan south of 96th Street.132 The New
York Taxi Workers Alliance, a union representing more than 20,000
taxi, green cab, car service, and rideshare drivers, contends the
current surcharge is severely harming the livelihoods of its
members.133 The industry, which has been supported in its quest for
an exemption by New York City Council members Ydanis Rodriguez
and Fernando Cabrera, argues that the addition of tolls under the
CBDTP will cause further harm to struggling, working-class drivers
already suffering from rideshare competition and the medallion
lending crisis.134 Industry leaders contend an exemption is necessary
to protect driver incomes and to enable the continued existence of
their industry in a densely populated city.135
Like their counterparts in the taxi and car service industry, private
bus and trucking companies are seeking exemptions from the CBDTP
as well.136 Bus operators argue they can serve as part of the solution
to congestion by transporting passengers who would otherwise be

130.
131.
132.
133.

Lynch, supra note 128.
Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
See Congestion Surcharge, supra note 125.

Our Fight to Exempt Yellow and Green Cabs from the Congestion
Surcharge!, N.Y. TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.nytwa.org/exemptnow
[https://perma.cc/4WQ5-LUYJ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Our Fight].
134. Julianne Cuba, Experts: Exempting Yellow Taxis from Congestion Pricing
STREETSBLOG
NYC
(May
22,
2019),
Won’t
Help
Cabbies,

https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/05/22/experts-exempting-yellow-taxis-from-congestio
n-pricing-wont-help-cabbies/ [https://perma.cc/GR4Q-SSVC]. Transportation experts
argue that an exemption for yellow taxis, which account for 20% of all miles traveled
in the CBD, would be devastating for the effectiveness of the CBDTP. Komanoff
called such an exemption “the mother of all carve outs.” Id. Experts also note that
the CBDTP is likely to yield a net benefit to the cab industry by reducing congestion
in the CBD, thereby increasing the number of fares drivers can complete in a given
time. Uber, perhaps realizing the CBDTP could benefit them in this way, spent $2
million lobbying for the program. Shannon Bond, Uber Spent $2m to Help Push New
York
Congestion
Charge,
FIN.
TIMES
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/bb89ecd0-558a-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1
[https://perma.cc/3WK5-FSY6].
135. See Cuba, supra note 134; Our Fight, supra note 133.
136. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
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using cars.137 In March 2019, several bus companies formed
BUS4NYC, an alliance to advocate in favor of congestion pricing and
public investment in bus-related infrastructure — along with an
exemption for buses under the CBDTP.138 The trucking industry is
likewise lobbying for an exemption and is seeking discussions with the
TMRB to educate the board on challenges truckers face.139 Both
industries argue exemptions are necessary to preserve the economic
viability of their operations without raising prices for consumers.140
Drivers of motorcycles and low-emission cars are seeking
exemptions, arguing their vehicles contribute less than conventional
automobiles to the congestion and pollution issues the CBDTP seeks
to address.141 There are almost 8000 electric cars registered in New
York City, and both state and city leaders support increased electric
car usage.142 New York State Assemblyman Felix Ortiz proposed a
bill in March 2019 that would have exempted clean fuel and electric
cars from congestion pricing fees, along with a separate bill exempting
Assemblyman Ortiz said an exemption for
motorcycles.143
motorcycles was a “common sense environmental issue” because
motorcycles cause less congestion than cars.144 The advocacy group
Riders Against Congestion argues that motorcycles are part of the

137. Id.
138. BUS4NYC: New Coalition Committed to Curbing Congestion Launches in
New
York
City,
BUS4NYC
(Mar.
25,
2019),
http://bus4nyc.org/2019/03/bus4nyc-new-coalition-committed-to-curbing-congestion-l
aunches-in-new-york-city/ [https://perma.cc/GH2U-D2P9]; see also Glenn Every,
Congestion Pricing Board Must Be Bus Friendly, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8775-congestion-pricing-board-must-be-busfriendly [https://perma.cc/4AP4-94EE].
139. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
140. See Jennifer Smith, Truckers Weigh Higher Costs, Open Roads in New York
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
1,
2019),
Fees,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/truckers-weigh-higher-costs-open-roads-in-new-york-fee
s-11554151481 [https://perma.cc/UAW3-8N8E]; BUS4NYC, supra note 138.
141. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99; Jeanmarie Evelly, Should Motorcycles and
Greener Cars Get a Pass on Congestion Pricing?, CITY LIMITS (May 14, 2019),
https://citylimits.org/2019/05/14/should-motorcycles-and-greener-cars-get-a-pass-on-c
ongestion-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/3KGG-GW9G].
142. Evelly, supra note 141. In 2018, Governor Cuomo launched a $250 million
initiative to increase the number of electric vehicle charging stations in New York
State. Id. Mayor de Blasio has stated a goal of having 20% of all cars in New York
City be electric by 2025. Id.
143. Id.
144. Jimmy Vielkind, Motorcyclists May Steer Clear of New Congestion-Pricing
Fee,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
29,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/motorcyclists-may-steer-clear-of-new-congestion-pricing
-fee-11553883939 [https://perma.cc/WA2W-BXWG].
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solution to New York’s traffic problems, because these vehicles cause
fewer emissions and less congestion than cars.145 Riders Against
Congestion also points out that motorcycles and scooters provide
efficient transportation options for residents of neighborhoods with
poor access to public transit.146
In addition to the professional and industry groups seeking
exemptions, various communities are likely to seek exemptions based
on geography. New York State Assemblyman David I. Weprin, a
strident opponent of congestion pricing, has called for an exemption
for all city residents.147 Elected officials representing New York’s
suburbs and outer boroughs are also seeking exemptions or the
removal of existing bridge and tunnel tolls to avoid double-charging
bridge and tunnel commuters travelling into the CBD: Long Island
State Senator Todd Kaminsky is seeking a credit for commuters
entering Manhattan via the Robert F. Kennedy Bridge,148 Bronx
Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz claims to have exchanged his support
for congestion pricing for a deal to offer Bronx residents free access
to the Henry Hudson Bridge,149 and U.S. Congressman Max Rose
and Staten Island Borough President James Oddo have urged
removal of the congestion fee for Staten Islanders travelling to
Manhattan via the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge.150
Adding to the exemptions sought for New York communities, New
Jersey officials have also sought an exemption for their
constituents.151 Approximately 115,000 people drive directly from
New Jersey into the CBD each weekday — accounting for about 13%
of all drivers entering the zone.152 New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy
145. Evelly, supra note 141.
146. Id.
147. Winnie Hu, Over $10 to Drive in Manhattan? What We Know about the
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2019),
Congestion
Pricing
Plan,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/nyregion/what-is-congestion-pricing.html?action
=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/2QAD-LKNN].
148. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
149. Ryan Hutchins & Dana Rubinstein, New York, New Jersey Governors Cut
Deal
on
Congestion
Pricing,
POLITICO
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2019/04/24/new-york-new-jersey-gov
ernors-cut-deal-on-congestion-pricing-986686
[https://perma.cc/4WDW-Z6FL].
Queens politicians claim to have secured a similar deal for the Cross Bay Veterans
Memorial Bridge. Id.
150. Shant Shahrigian, Lawmakers Call for Exemptions from NYC’s Controversial
Congestion
Pricing
Plan,
N.Y.
POST
(July
6,
2019),
https://nypost.com/2019/07/06/lawmakers-call-for-exemptions-from-nycs-controversia
l-congestion-pricing-plan/ [https://perma.cc/SKP5-7Z2F].
151. Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing, supra note 89.
152. Id.
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initially suggested CBDTP revenues be shared with the Port
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) and New Jersey Transit, two rail
services that serve New Jersey commuters, but later discussions
between Governor Murphy and Governor Cuomo centered around
providing credits towards congestion pricing fees for tolls paid at
Hudson River crossings between New York and New Jersey.153
Initial reports of a deal between the two governors to provide these
credits, effectively implementing an exemption for all New Jersey
commuters,154 were denied by the MTA.155 MTA Chairman Patrick
Foye insisted the MTA would make decisions about credits,
exemptions, and carve-outs only after conducting traffic studies and
receiving recommendations from the TMRB.156 If negotiations
between New York and New Jersey fail to yield an agreement, New
Jersey officials, like others seeking exemptions, may be forced to
explore litigation or legislation as a means of obtaining relief from
CBDTP tolls.
E. Creation of Exemptions through Litigation and Legislation

In the event any of the above groups fail to secure an exemption
from the TBTA, these officials and professional organizations may try
to secure relief from the CBDTP through litigation or legislative
advocacy. Litigation by the taxi industry regarding the congestion
surcharge implemented earlier this year157 provides a preview of the
claims groups seeking exemptions may bring against the State of New
York. In Taxifleet Management LLC v. State of New York,158 a
group of medallion taxi owners asserted several causes of action in
New York State Supreme Court in their attempt to halt the

153. Larry Higgs, N.Y. Will Cut Us a Break on Congestion Pricing, Murphy Says,
(Apr.
25,
2019),
NJ.COM
https://www.nj.com/traffic/2019/04/nj-drivers-will-not-be-double-taxed-by-nyc-undercongestion-pricing-deal-murphy-said.html [https://perma.cc/6U37-YDUZ].
154. Hutchins & Rubinstein, supra note 149. Transit advocates had widely assumed
that commuters using the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, which both empty directly
into the CBD, would receive credits. Id. Assurance by Governor Cuomo that
commuters using the George Washington Bridge, which empties into Manhattan
north of the CBD, would be treated equally would likely result in all New Jersey
commuters being exempt from CBDTP tolls. Id.
155. Jen Chung, NJ Governor Anticipates a Congestion Pricing Exemption, MTA
GOTHAMIST
(Apr.
25,
2019),
Says
‘Huh?’,
https://gothamist.com/news/nj-governor-anticipates-a-congestion-pricing-exemptionmta-says-huh [https://perma.cc/J6EH-5DJL].
156. Id.
157. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
158. No. 161920/18, 2019 WL 2995810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 9, 2019).
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surcharge. The complaint alleged the surcharge specifically targeted
for-hire vehicles despite the state’s lack of a specific finding that these
vehicles were a cause of congestion.159 The petitioners argued the
surcharge, in singling out for-hire vehicles without a rational basis,
violated both the state and federal constitutions.160 While these
arguments ultimately failed to sway the court,161 they may provide a
blueprint for groups denied exemptions. Exemptions provided by the
TBTA, if not sufficiently justified by cost, efficiency, public safety, or
other concerns, may leave the agency open to lawsuits brought in
court arguing the agency has arbitrarily favored certain groups over
others.
Interested parties may also seek to secure exemptions from the
CBDTP through specific acts of legislation. While the New York
State Legislature’s deferral of decisions regarding toll rates and
exemptions under the CBDTP to the TMRB162 may be indicative of
its hesitancy to wade into the political thicket of exemptions, effective
lobbying efforts could yield results for groups with sufficient influence
in Albany. The opaque and complex nature of most lobbying
campaigns makes it difficult to quantify the success of previous
lobbying efforts by groups seeking exemptions, but the scale of
lobbying expenditures in New York State indicates lobbying is
pervasive. Aggregate spending on lobbying in New York hit an
all-time high of nearly $262 million in 2018, an increase of more than

159. Id. at *3.
160. Id. In total, petitioners asserted five distinct causes of action. Id. The first
alleged the arbitrary and capricious nature of the surcharge violated both the New
York State Constitution and U.S. Constitution. Id. The second alleged violation of
due process rights under both constitutions. Id. The third alleged violation of equal
protection, on the basis that the surcharge treated taxis and for-hire vehicles
differently from other vehicles without rational basis. Id. The fourth alleged that the
difference in the surcharge for taxis and for other for-hire vehicles violated Article 16
Section 4 of the New York State Constitution. Id. The fifth alleged the state
legislature’s passage of the surcharge violated the Home Rule Clause of the New
York State Constitution. Id.
161. Id. at *7. In addition to holding that the surcharge is a rational means of
pursuing the state’s legitimate objective of reducing congestion in lower Manhattan,
id. at *5, the court held that targeting for-hire vehicles before implementing a
broader congestion pricing scheme “is rational given the ease of collecting a tax from
[for-hire vehicles] without the installation of any specific tolling devices or gateways,
etc.” Id. at *6.
162. Connor Harris, Congestion Disaffection, CITY J. (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.city-journal.org/exemptions-congestion-pricing
[https://perma.cc/3C9A-QSCA].
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$21 million from 2017.163 The transportation industry had lobbying
expenditures of $13,688,570.164 Uber, which invested $2 million
lobbying for congestion pricing in New York City,165 spent more on
lobbying than any other entity in the state, with total expenditures of
$5,989,966.166 These expenditures indicate the scale of resources
industries and advocacy groups will invest to secure favorable
legislation or deter unfavorable legislation in Albany.
In addition to lobbying efforts in Albany, parties seeking
exemptions may also turn to the federal government for relief from
CBDTP tolls. In May, two U.S. congressmen from New Jersey, Josh
Gottheimer and Chris Smith, introduced the Anti-Congestion Tax
Act — bipartisan federal legislation aimed at combatting congestion
pricing fees for New Jersey commuters.167 The Act would prohibit
the award of federal grants for MTA projects until New Jersey
residents receive an exemption from the CBDTP and would create a
federal tax credit to offset congestion pricing fees paid by New Jersey
residents.168 The Anti-Congestion Tax Act mirrors a strategy used by
Guy V. Molinari, a U.S. congressman representing Staten Island, who
in 1985 successfully attached a provision to a Federal Department of
Transportation appropriations bill mandating that New York lose 1%
of its federal transportation aid if tolls on Brooklyn-bound traffic over
the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge were not removed.169 Molinari’s
gambit prompted the MTA to remove the tolls despite a predicted
$10 million loss in revenue from the change and predictions from
traffic experts that it would increase congestion in Brooklyn and
lower Manhattan.170
163. N.Y. STATE JOINT COMM’N ON PUB. ETHICS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2019),
https://jcope.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/04/2018-annual-report-compiled-fin
al41019.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2XM-7YWT].
164. Id. at 42.
165. Bond, supra note 134.
166. N.Y. STATE JOINT COMM’N ON PUB. ETHICS, supra note 163, at 34.
167. Press Release, Josh Gottheimer, Gottheimer, Smith Introduce Bipartisan
Legislation to Fight Back against New York Congestion Tax (May 6, 2019),
https://gottheimer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1316
[https://perma.cc/GLD9-6KVU].
168. Id.
169. James Brooke, One-Way Toll Plan Voted for Verrazano’s Travelers, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
1,
1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/01/nyregion/one-way-toll-plan-voted-for-verrazano
-s-travelers.html [https://perma.cc/R5HT-R2MV].
170. Id. After 34 years, a federal spending package signed into law in December
2019 removed the ban on two-way tolling on the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge. Local
members of Congress, led by Staten Island Congressman Max Rose, supported the
measure. MTA and independent consultants predict the removal of two-way tolling
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III. CREATING AN EXEMPTION SYSTEM THAT ADVANCES
TRANSPORTATION EQUITY

This Part applies the lens of transportation equity to the issue of
exemptions under the CBDTP. Section III.A seeks to define
transportation equity by examining different conceptions of the term.
Section III.B formulates a two-part test for determining which
exemptions to the CBDTP are likely to advance transportation
equity. Section III.C applies this test to the various groups and
communities currently seeking exemptions from the CBDTP. Finally,
Section III.D suggests alternative strategies for ensuring the CBDTP
supports, rather than hinders, creation of an equitable transportation
system in the New York City region.
A. Defining Transportation Equity

Authorities can measure the consequences of congestion pricing
for various subsets of a region’s population through the concept of
transportation equity. Measurement of transportation equity involves
comparisons of transportation benefits, burdens, and resource
allocations between neighborhoods with high concentrations of
vulnerable populations and regional averages.171 Advocates of
transportation equity seek to create fairness in mobility,
transportation access, and transportation cost across races, classes,
and geographies.172 Factors in determining transportation equity
include environmental consequences of transportation policies,
discrepancies in resource allocation and investment, and distribution
of service across various population groups.173 Transportation equity
is difficult to measure because there is no single, agreed-upon

will reduce traffic congestion on Staten Island, generate additional revenue for
transportation projects, and deter the practice of “toll shopping,” which incentivized
drivers to enter New York City through Staten Island rather than through more
direct routes. Erik Bascome, With Legislation Signed, Split Tolling No Longer
Banned on Verrazzano Bridge, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://www.silive.com/news/2019/12/with-legislation-signed-split-tolling-no-longer-ba
nned-on-verrazzano-bridge.html [https://perma.cc/4XS4-XM57].
171. Equity,
U.S.
DEP’T
TRANSP.
(Dec.
17,
2013),
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/health/equity [https://perma.cc/F3MT-47W3].
172. Sean B. Seymore, Set the Captives Free!: Transit Inequity in Urban Centers,
and the Laws and Policies Which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON. U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 57, 61 (2005).
173. Id.
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definition of the concept.174 Various categorizations of actors,
analyses of impacts, and methods of measurement can all yield
differing determinations of what is “equitable.”175
Researcher Todd Litman of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute
defines three separate conceptualizations of transportation equity:
“horizontal equity,” “vertical equity with regard to income and social
class,” and “vertical equity with regard to mobility, need, and
Horizontal equity examines the distribution of
ability.”176
transportation impacts among individuals and groups with equal
abilities and needs.177 Horizontal equity suggests that public policies
should avoid favoring one group or individual over others.178
Transportation users should “get what they pay for and pay for what
they get.”179 Vertical equity contemplates the distribution of
transportation impacts among individuals and groups with differing
abilities and needs.180 Vertical equity with regard to income and
social class explicitly encourages progressive transportation policies
that favor economically and socially disadvantaged groups to
compensate for broader inequalities.181 Vertical equity with regard to
mobility, need, and ability focuses on ensuring transportation systems
are designed to support the needs of users with physical disabilities.182
Litman is not the only theorist with a tripartite theory on equity
within transportation policy. Robert Bullard of Texas Southern
University — considered by some to be the father of environmental
justice183 — has separately defined three conceptualizations of
transportation equity: procedural equity, geographic equity, and
social equity.184 Procedural equity focuses on the process by which
transportation decisions are made and executed, and considers

174. TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., EVALUATING
TRANSPORTATION EQUITY: GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING DISTRIBUTIONAL
IMPACTS IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 2 (2006).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Dr.
Robert
Bullard,
TEX.
SOUTHERN
U.,
http://bjmlspa.tsu.edu/faculty/dr-robert-bullard/ [https://perma.cc/MN45-MLKZ] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2020).
184. Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United
States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1188 (2003).
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whether rules apply equally to everyone.185 Geographic equity
focuses on how transportation decisions affect individuals and
communities in different geographic locations.186 Social equity
focuses on distribution of transportation benefits and burdens across
racial, socioeconomic, and generational classes.187 Although they
differ slightly in their organization, Bullock’s and Litman’s
conceptualizations of transportation equity share an emphasis on the
disparate impacts of transportation decisions on different
communities and classes of people.
Whether, and to what extent, a congestion pricing plan advances
transportation equity depends both on how communities and
institutions measure equity and on the specifics of the plan itself,
particularly the uses of the revenue raised through tolls. Traditional
transportation pricing instruments, such as subway fares or bridge and
tunnel tolls, advance Litman’s idea of horizontal equity. Those
utilizing a piece of transportation infrastructure bear the costs
associated with building and maintaining that infrastructure.188
People “get what they pay for and pay for what they get.”189
Congestion pricing also advances horizontal equity by imposing a cost
on the externalities inherent to automobile travel through congested
areas, such as emissions, noise pollution, and the potential for
accidents. When, as in New York, the state directs revenues from
congestion pricing towards public transportation, though, congestion
pricing additionally functions in a more directly progressive manner,
advancing Litman’s concept of vertical transportation equity.190 This
directed use of revenues advances vertical transportation equity
because the median income of commuters who take public
transportation is lower than that of commuters who drive to work on
their own,191 so congestion pricing channels resources away from

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Tolling and Pricing Defined, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/tolling_and_pricing/defined/
[https://perma.cc/P332-Z8PU] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020); see Emma G. Fitzsimmons,
M.T.A. Is Raising Fares and Tolls; One Subway or Bus Ride Will Cost $2.75, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/nyregion/mta-raises-fares-subways-and-buses.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/G6BE-SH9C].
189. See LITMAN, supra note 174, at 4.
190. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 553-j (McKinney 2019); Gerrard & McTiernan, supra
note 84.
191. In the New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan Statistical
Area, defined as the five boroughs of New York City plus Dutchess, Nassau, Orange,
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relatively high-income individuals towards systems utilized by
relatively low-income individuals.192 If the state were to use
congestion pricing revenue in a manner that does not benefit the
public, or if the costs of congestion pricing were imposed

Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties in New York, Bergen, Essex,
Hudson, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset,
Sussex, and Union Counties in New Jersey, and Pike County, Pennsylvania, U.S.
Census Bureau, Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA), Metropolitan Divisions, and
Combined
Statistical
Areas
(CSA),
April
2018
(2018),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/metromicro/geographies/reference-files/2
018/delineation-files/list1.xls [https://perma.cc/76L4-MDY4], the average median
income of those who drove to work solo was $51,032 in 2018. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2018) [hereinafter AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY]. The average median income of those who commuted via public transit was
$47,387. Id. The overall average median income was $47,511. Id. In the New
York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, defined as the
five boroughs of New York City plus Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland,
Suffolk, and Westchester Counties in New York, Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon,
Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, and Union
Counties in New Jersey, and Pike County, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CORE BASED STATISTICAL AREAS (CBSA), METROPOLITAN DIVISIONS APRIL 2018,
AND
COMBINED
STATISTICAL
AREAS
(CSA)
(2018),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/metromicro/geographies/reference-files/2
018/delineation-files/list1.xls [https://perma.cc/76L4-MDY4], the average median
income of those who drove to work solo was $51,032 in 2018. AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY, supra note 191. The average median income of those who
commuted via public transit was $47,387. Id. The overall average median income was
$47,511. Id. In the New York State legislative districts with the highest number of
commuters into the CBD, all located in Manhattan, drivers are significantly wealthier
than public transit users. Congestion Pricing: An Analysis of New York State
Legislative
Districts,
TRI-STATE
TRANSP.
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.tstc.org/congestion-pricing-an-analysis-of-new-york-state-legislative-distri
cts/ [https://perma.cc/H6AU-DFWU] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). This mirrors trends
on a national level, where public transportation commuters are disproportionately
poorer than drivers in nearly every city with significant public transportation
ridership. Mike Maciag, Public Transportation’s Demographic Divide, GOVERNING
(Feb.
25,
2014),
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-public-transporta
tion-riders-demographic-divide-for-cities.html [https://perma.cc/CG6M-6VWT]. In
2014, commuters driving alone to work reported $4,314 higher earnings than those
taking public transportation. Id.
192. This fact was a point of controversy during the debate over implementing
congestion pricing in New York, when some elected officials, including Mayor de
Blasio, erroneously argued that congestion pricing would function as a regressive tax.
See Gersh Kuntzman, If Congestion Pricing Fails, Remember These Insane
Comments by Assembly Member Rodneyse Bichotte, STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 21,
2019),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/03/21/if-congestion-pricing-fails-rememberthese-insane-comments-by-assembly-member-rodneyse-bichotte/
[https://perma.cc/ZA6V-K6U2].
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disproportionately on lower-income individuals, this would not be the
case.193
Whether congestion pricing advances Bullard’s conceptualizations
of transportation equity also depends on the specifics of the system’s
implementation. While the state legislature has already established
the procedural elements of New York’s CBDTP, those tasked with
implementing the plan will need to ensure it does not negatively
impact geographic or social equity. Doing so will involve designing a
tolling structure that disincentivizes driving overall rather than simply
shifting traffic congestion and the associated emissions away from
Manhattan’s CBD into lower-income areas. The TBTA must create a
system of toll credits and exemptions that ensures low-income
individuals without access to mass transit do not lose access to
economic opportunities in lower Manhattan. The MTA must ensure
CBDTP revenues are targeted towards communities with the greatest
need for public transit improvements, rather than used to subsidize
projects
disproportionately
benefitting
high-income
neighborhoods.194 In determining the details of the CBDTP’s design
and implementation, the TBTA and MTA must ensure the program
is executed in a progressive manner and avoid imposing new tolls on
residents of economically disadvantaged neighborhoods and
communities without providing corresponding benefits in the form of
increased investment in public transportation.
B. Determining Which Exemptions Advance Transportation Equity

In determining which exemptions to grant under the CBDTP, the
TMRB and TBTA should take care to maintain the benefits of the
CBDTP for both horizontal and vertical transportation equity. To
maintain horizontal equity, these authorities must ensure exemptions
prevent a net increase in negative externalities stemming from
Exemptions should disincentivize
congestion and emissions.195
travelers from utilizing transportation options, such as air travel or
longer driving routes, that cause greater emissions or congestion as a

193. One can tell a similar story regarding the effects of congestion pricing on
vertical equity with regard to mobility need and ability. The degree to which the costs
of congestion pricing are directed at individuals with disabilities and the revenues are
used to benefit individuals with disabilities can vary substantially based upon
implementation decisions.
194. See generally Bullard, supra note 184, at 1188.
195. See LITMAN, supra note 174, at 5. Because all people experience the negative
effects of emissions but not all people benefit from the vehicles causing the emissions,
emissions have an inherently adverse effect on horizontal transportation equity.
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result of CBDTP tolls. To maintain vertical equity, the TMRB and
TBTA must ensure that exemptions do not act regressively by
disproportionately benefitting wealthy individuals and pushing the
burden of funding public transportation onto those with lesser
means.196 Exemptions should protect the viability of low-cost
transportation options so that the CBDTP does not raise overall
transportation costs for low-income individuals.
The dual
considerations of horizontal and vertical equity yield a two-part test
for determining which exemptions should be granted: an exemption
should be granted if, and only if, lack thereof will (1) direct affected
individuals towards less efficient modes of transportation (i.e. those
that cause greater emissions or congestion); or (2) function
regressively by causing low-income communities to bear a
disproportionately large share of transportation infrastructure costs.
This test’s application will ensure exemptions serve to advance, rather
than undermine, the core objectives of the CBDTP.
Because even limited exemptions will significantly undercut the
benefits of the CBDTP,197 this test presumes exemptions should be
limited to instances where they are necessary to preserve the
program’s objectives of reducing emissions and congestion and of
raising revenue for public transportation in the New York City
region. The dual-pronged test ignores external political and social
concerns that might otherwise weigh in favor of exemptions for
particular groups.198 While the relevant authorities may ultimately
determine that these concerns justify creation of exemptions that do
not pass the two-part test, these authorities should do so with the
knowledge that such exemptions come with environmental and
financial costs. Applying the test to the groups currently seeking
exemptions will allow the authorities to make equitable and sound
policy judgements.

196. The two exemptions included in the CBDTP’s enacting legislation — the
exemption for vehicles carrying persons with disabilities and the tax credit for CBD
residents making less than $60,000 — both reflect these objectives. The disability
exemption furthers Litman’s concept of vertical equity with regard to mobility need
and ability, while the tax credit helps to preserve vertical equity with regard to
income and social class by diverting costs from the CBDTP away from some of the
CBD’s poorest residents.
197. See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text.
198. For example, the Police Benevolent Association argues that an exemption for
first responders would provide benefits for public safety. See Lynch, supra note 128.
The taxi industry and its advocates on the city council argue that lack of an
exemption will have a devastating effect on the livelihoods of taxi drivers. See Cuba,
supra note 134; Our Fight, supra note 133.
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C. Who Should Get an Exemption?

Application of the two-part test shows which exemptions serve to
advance the transportation equity benefits of the CBDTP, and which
undermine those benefits. Exemptions can advance horizontal
transportation equity, fulfilling the first prong of the test, by lowering
overall transportation-related emissions and improving travel times.
Examples include exemptions that deter toll shopping — the practice
of driving a longer distance to minimize toll costs199 — and
exemptions that promote land-based commercial mass transit as a
low-emission alternative to air travel and solo car travel.200
Exemptions can advance vertical transportation equity, fulfilling the
second part of the test, by preserving the affordability of inexpensive
mass transportation options, such as commercial inter-city bus travel,
for low-income individuals.201
One broad trend that appears when applying the two-part test is
that it disfavors exemptions for single-occupancy vehicles. For almost
all drivers of single-occupancy vehicles, the primary reasonable,
lower-cost alternatives for entering the CBD are public
transportation — in most cases buses, commuter rail, or heavy rail
systems — cycling, or walking. All of these options contribute less to
traffic congestion and carbon dioxide emissions than single-occupancy
vehicles.202 These options are also cheaper than commuting into the
199. JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 6.
200. Climate Change: Should You Fly, Drive or Take the Train?, BBC NEWS (Aug.
24,
2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-49349566
[https://perma.cc/2KCX-T6A4]. Bus travel results in 104g of carbon dioxide emissions
per passenger per kilometer traveled. Rail travel results in 41g per passenger per
kilometer. Domestic air travel results in 133g per passenger per kilometer plus an
additional 121g in secondary effects from high-altitude, non-carbon dioxide
emissions. Car travel results in 171g of carbon dioxide emissions per passenger per
kilometer, although this number is reduced proportionally if more than one
passenger is travelling in a car. Id.
201. Commercial bus travel generally serves as the least expensive means of
intercity transportation. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
202. A single-occupancy vehicle emits an average of 0.96 pounds of carbon dioxide
per passenger mile. TINA HODGES, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION’S ROLE IN RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2010),
https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/docs/PublicTransportationsRoleInR
espondingToClimateChange2010.pdf. [https://perma.cc/A2JU-GYTC]. At average
occupancy, buses emit 0.64 pounds per passenger mile, commuter rail emits 0.33
pounds, and heavy rail (such as the New York City subway) emits 0.23 pounds. Id.
While a four-person carpool reduces a car’s emissions to 0.24 pounds of carbon
dioxide per passenger mile, full occupancy also lowers the emissions of public
transport to 0.18 pounds of carbon dioxide per passenger mile for buses, 0.10 pounds
for commuter rail, and 0.11 pounds for heavy rail. Id. For a full account of how the
New York City region’s mass transit services fare against national averages in terms
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CBD via single-occupancy vehicle or relying upon single-occupancy
vehicles such as taxis or rideshare vehicles to travel within the zone.203
This means that lack of exemptions for operators of single-occupancy
vehicles would, in most cases, not direct individuals towards less
efficient modes of transportation and would not function in a
regressive manner. Exemptions for police personnel,204 taxis,205
rideshares,206 for-hire vehicles,207 motorcycles,208 electric vehicles,209
of carbon dioxide emissions, see id. at 11–16. While walking and cycling do result in
some carbon dioxide emissions, these emissions pale in comparison to those
produced by any other method of transportation, assuming the individual at issue
consumes a normal diet. See Brian Palmer, Two Wheels vs. Four, SLATE (Aug. 9,
2011),
https://slate.com/technology/2011/08/how-soon-does-a-bike-pay-back-itsinitial-carbon-footprint.html [https://perma.cc/GR3A-NTBK].
203. The American Public Transportation Association estimates that the average
New York commuter could save $1247 a month and $14,969 annually by owning and
driving one fewer car and instead commuting via public transportation. Press
Release, Am. Pub. Transp. Ass’n, June Transit Savings Report: Soaring Gas Prices
Take Transit Savings to Highest Level of the Year (June 8, 2018),
https://www.apta.com/news-publications/press-releases/releases/june-transit-savings-r
eport-soaring-gas-prices-take-transit-savings-to-highest-level-of-the-year/
[https://perma.cc/798R-K69S]. The fare for a subway or local bus ride in New York
City is $2.75. The fare for an express bus ride is $6.75. Fares & MetroCard, MTA,
http://web.mta.info/metrocard/mcgtreng.htm [https://perma.cc/A3U9-LYQ2] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2019). Accounting for New York’s existing congestion surcharge, the
minimum taxi fare in Manhattan is $5.80 and the minimum Uber cost is $10.75. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
204. This exemption would not function in a regressive manner because police
officers earn more than the median income in most New York City neighborhoods.
Although the starting salary for NYPD officers is $42,500, compensation reaches
$85,292 after five and a half years. After accounting for holiday pay, longevity pay,
uniform allowance, night differential, and overtime, officers can take home over
$100,000
a
year.
Salary
and
Benefits,
NYPD,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/careers/police-officers/po-benefits.page
[https://perma.cc/7AD4-X2AV] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). In contrast, the average
median income in the New York-Jersey City-White Plains Metropolitan Division is
$48,776. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, supra note 191.
205. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. While motorcycles contribute less to congestion than conventional cars, they
emit more pollution. A California Air Resources Board comparison of
emissions-compliant vehicles found that the average motorcycle is ten times more
polluting per mile than a passenger car, light truck, or SUV. Susan Carpenter,
Motorcycles and Emissions: The Surprising Facts, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014),
https://www.latimes.com/news/la-hy-throttle11-2008jun11-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7L4Q-DWZE]. Lack of an exemption for motorcycles would not
function in a regressive manner because motorcycle owners have higher than average
incomes. The 2018 median household income of a motorcycle owner was $62,500.
Ron Lieback, Motorcycle Statistics in America: Demographics Change for 2018,
MOTORCYCLING
(Feb.
7,
2019),
ULTIMATE
https://ultimatemotorcycling.com/2019/02/07/motorcycle-statistics-in-america-demogr
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and trucking companies210 are all inadvisable according to the
two-part test. These exemptions would not advance horizontal equity
by reducing emissions and congestion, and would not advance vertical
equity by preserving low-cost transportation options.
Commercial mass transit receives mixed results under the two-part
test. Like single-occupancy vehicles, sightseeing tour buses fare
poorly. Because rideshare vehicles and taxis would pay CBDTP
charges, consumers avoiding tour buses due to cost would likely
gravitate towards public transportation or walking, both of which
create less emissions and congestion than buses.211 Since sightseeing
tours are a non-essential luxury expense and are more expensive than
the readily available alternative of public transportation,212 CBDTP
charges on these buses would not function regressively, so an
exemption is not appropriate.
Long-distance bus lines present a different story. The primary
alternatives to long-distance bus travel are rail travel, air travel, and
individual car travel. Rail travel results in fewer emissions than bus
aphics-change-for-2018/ [https://perma.cc/94PH-AQ2X]. The overall median
household income in 2018 was $61,937. Gloria Guzman, U.S. Median Household
Income up in 2018 from 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/us-median-household-income-up-in-20
18-from-2017.html [https://perma.cc/Y3JR-FWKE].
209. Electric vehicles provide no congestion benefits and contribute to pollution.
In New York, the average electric vehicle is responsible for 1883 pounds of carbon
dioxide-equivalent emissions per year. Emissions from Hybrid and Plug-In Electric
Vehicles,
U.S.
DEP’T
ENERGY,
https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.html
[https://perma.cc/HC68-6VYH] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). The average electric Ford
Focus buyer in 2015 had an average household income of $199,000. Chris Woodyard,
Study: Electric Car Buyers Are Younger but Richer, USA TODAY (May 4, 2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/05/04/truecar-study-electric-cars-ric
her/26884511/ [https://perma.cc/YZM2-BR4R]. The average household income of
buyers of the conventional Focus was $77,000. Id.
210. Presumably, consumers within the CBD would bear the extra shipping costs
imposed by the CBDTP. Manhattan’s median household income of $82,459 between
2014 and 2018 was higher than the citywide figure of $60,762. QuickFacts: Income &
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(July
2,
2019),
Poverty,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork,newyorkcountyma
nhattanboroughnewyork,US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/26EE-WYST]. The extra
costs for CBD residents would therefore be unlikely to function in a regressive
manner.
211. See supra note 202.
212. A single ride pass on a New York Sightseeing bus costs $19. Downtown Tour
N.Y.
SIGHTSEEING,
—
Single
Ride
Pass,
https://www.newyorksightseeing.com/double-decker-bus-tours/downtown-tour-single
-ride-pass.html [https://perma.cc/7NDQ-665W] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). The fare
for a subway or local bus ride in New York City is $2.75. Fares & Metrocard, supra
note 203.
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travel, but air travel and — depending on the number of passengers
— individual car travel do not.213 Lack of an exemption for
long-distance bus travel may therefore direct some individuals
towards less efficient modes of transportation. Air travel, train travel,
and individual car travel are also generally more expensive than
long-distance bus travel.214 Therefore, lack of an exemption for
long-distance bus travel may function regressively by
disproportionately impacting lower-income individuals without access
to rail, air, or car travel. While long-distance bus lines could reduce
costs and congestion by simply moving their pick-up points outside of
the CBD, these buses still constitute one of the few classes of vehicles
for which an exemption is appropriate under the two-part test.
When it comes to exemptions for bridge and tunnel commuters,
including New Jersey residents, application of the two-part test is
more complicated. The test disfavors exemptions for commuters in
single-occupancy vehicles travelling to destinations inside the CBD
for the same reasons it disfavors exemptions for single-occupancy
vehicles generally.215 But for commuters travelling through the
congestion zone, an exemption may be appropriate. This is because
without an exemption these commuters may engage in toll shopping
and take unnecessarily long routes to avoid CBDTP tolls.216 For
example, a commuter travelling from Secaucus, New Jersey to Long
Island City, Queens may, instead of taking the direct 8.5 mile route
through the Lincoln and Queens-Midtown Tunnels, opt to take the
longer 23.2 mile route over the George Washington Bridge in order

213. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
214. For example, a one-way flight from New York City to Washington D.C. on
October 5, 2020, cost $99 as of April 5, 2020. One-Way Flights from N.Y.C. to
Washington,
D.C.
for
October
5,
2020,
KAYAK,
https://www.kayak.com/flights/NYC-WAS/2019-12-09?sort=bestflight_a (search start
point field for “New York, NY” and search destination field for “Washington, D.C.”)
(Apr. 5, 2020, 1:55 PM). The same trip on Amtrak costs $54. Id. Via Greyhound bus,
the trip costs $14 on the same date. One-Way Trip from N.Y.C. to Washington, D.C.
for
October
5,
2020,
WANDERU,
https://www.wanderu.com/en-us/depart/New%20York%2C%20NY%2C%20USA/Wa
shington%2C%20DC%2C%20USA/2020-10-05/?aid=kayak&cur=USD&da=-nycblt3
%2C-nycblt11%2C-nycpen%2C-nycwdx1%2C-nycusour7%2C-knggli%7C-dcawdx%2
C-svsgli%2C-svsppl%2C-alxamt%2C-usllpgli&dm=bus&dpid=ChIJW-T2Wt7Gt4kR
Kl2I1CJFUsI&ds=cheapest&opid=ChIJOwg_06VPwokRYv534QaPC8g&tid=Z_89P
SMHda4hQiZh%240GMKg (search start point field for “New York, NY” and search
destination field for “Washington, D.C.”) (Apr. 5, 2020, 1:55 PM). While the cost of
travelling by individual car varies depending on the model of the car and fuel prices,
use of this mode of transportation requires that the individual have access to a car.
215. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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to bypass the CBD.217 In this case, and others like it, lack of an
exemption would fail the first prong of the test and impair the
CBDTP’s benefits for horizontal equity because it would lead to an
increase in overall emissions and may also lead to increased traffic
congestion at bridges and tunnels that do not empty into the CBD.
To combat the problem of toll shopping, which already contributes to
existing transportation inequity in the New York region,218 the
TMRB and TBTA, informed by traffic studies, will need to consider
various pricing instruments, such as dynamic pricing,219 two-way
tolling,220 and credits for bridge and tunnel crossings,221 in order to
optimally reduce congestion while collecting sufficient tolls to meet
the CBDTP’s revenue target. While blanket exemptions provide one
method of addressing the CBDTP’s impact on transportation equity,
there are various alternatives that, in many cases, may be more
effective at doing so.
D. Alternatives to Exemptions

Application of the two-part test demonstrates that authorities can
grant few classes of vehicles blanket exemptions under the CBDTP
without undermining the plan’s core emissions reduction, congestion
reduction, and revenue generation objectives. Some of the groups
seeking exemptions, though, particularly outer-borough and suburban
New York and New Jersey residents, do raise legitimate questions
about the effects of the CBDTP on transportation equity in the New

217. Driving Directions from Secaucus, NJ to Long Island City, Queens, NY,
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search
starting point field for “Secaucus, NJ” and search destination field for “Long Island
City, Queens, NY”).
218. See JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 6–7.
219. By varying the price of CBDTP tolls based on time of day, the TBTA can
incentivize certain drivers to shift their travel to low-traffic periods. Id. at 9.
220. Two-way tolling, which charges drivers both to enter and exit the CBD,
enhances the effectiveness of dynamic pricing by incentivizing drivers to time both
their arrivals to and departures from the CBD to low-traffic periods. Id. at 8.
Infrastructure used for two-way tolling could also be used to identify, and give
exemptions to, drivers who pass through the CBD in a short period of time, helping
to address the toll shopping problem outlined above.
221. By granting credits for certain bridge and tunnel crossings, the TBTA can
equalize the cost of entering the CBD from all access points, helping to address
existing toll shopping problems in the region. Id. at 15. However, these credits must
be limited so as not to jeopardize the CBDTP’s ability to meet its revenue goals. Id.
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York City region.222 These concerns, however, can be more
effectively addressed through actions other than blanket exemptions.
For example, New Jersey officials’ argument that the CBDTP
unfairly penalizes New Jersey residents223 points to genuine concern
about the CBDTP’s effects on horizontal transportation equity. In
the current framework for the CBDTP, New Jersey commuters will
not “get what they pay for and pay for what they get” under the
CBDTP.224 They will be forced to pay additional tolls or switch to
public transit but will receive limited benefits from the revenue
raised.225 However, creating a blanket exemption for New Jersey
residents would undermine the core goals of the CBDTP by reducing
the program’s revenue-generating capacity, as well as its associated
reductions in congestion and emissions.
The relevant authorities could more effectively address the
concerns of New Jersey residents by designating a portion of revenue
generated by the CBDTP for investment in New Jersey public
transportation systems, such as PATH or NJ Transit rail and bus
operations.
This solution would result in less revenue for
transportation projects in New York, but would preserve the
congestion and emissions benefits of the CBDTP while addressing
concerns about horizontal equity for New Jersey commuters.226 Such
an agreement, although politically difficult due to New Jersey
politicians’ lack of control over the New York State budget process,
would ensure that New Jersey commuters receive benefits from the
CBDTP that make up for their costs.

222. See Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing, supra note 89;
Gersh Kuntzman, Congestion Pricing Opponents Reveal They Are Completely out
of Ideas — And Easily Flustered, Too!, STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/03/24/congestion-pricing-opponents-reveal-they-are-c
ompletely-out-of-ideas-and-easily-flustered-too/
[https://perma.cc/J4TA-MGDJ].
Although congestion pricing does not, on the whole, function as a regressive tax on
outer-borough and suburban commuters, see supra notes 190–93 and accompanying
text, it does create a new financial burden for low-income individuals for whom solo
automobile travel into the CBD is unavoidable.
223. See Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing, supra note 89.
224. See LITMAN, supra note 174, at 3.
225. Because the legislature designated set portions of CBDTP revenue for the
LIRR and Metro-North, the program will help fund transit improvements benefitting
commuters throughout Long Island and the lower Hudson Valley, in addition to New
York City. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. New Jersey commuters, on the
other hand, will only benefit from CBDTP revenue to the extent they rely on the
New York City subway after entering the CBD.
226. Increased investment in public transit in New Jersey may even increase the
congestion and emissions benefits of the CBDTP by making it more convenient for
New Jersey auto commuters to switch to public transportation.
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In a broader sense, the geographic distribution of revenues from
the CBDTP will play a key role in determining the degree to which
the program advances transportation equity. Focusing funding for
transportation projects on areas of the New York City region poorly
served by public transit can help promote horizontal equity by
ensuring individuals forced to pay CBDTP tolls due to lack of
accessible public transportation options for entering the CBD
ultimately benefit from the CBDTP revenue.
Public transit
investments in economically disadvantaged areas can promote
vertical equity by ensuring that low-income communities — which
often are disproportionately affected by transportation-related
pollution227 — benefit from increased economic opportunity tied to
improved transportation access. A plan for distribution of CBDTP
revenue that specifically targets areas poorly served by mass transit
and low-income communities would allow for an equitable
distribution of the costs and benefits of congestion pricing.
The creation of additional tax credits can also address concerns
about the burden of CBDTP tolls on low-income individuals. The
legislation enacting the CBDTP already includes a tax credit for
residents of the CBD with annual incomes less than $60,000.228 To
address concerns that CBDTP tolls may prevent low-income
individuals residing outside the CBD from accessing economic
opportunities inside the CBD, the TBTA could expand this tax credit
to cover all New York State residents with incomes below $60,000
residing in areas with poor access to public transportation. This tax
credit expansion would ensure the CBDTP advances, rather than
hinders, transportation equity and does not impair low-income
individuals’ access to the CBD. The TBTA could also offer tax
credits to small businesses whose economic viability is threatened due
to CBDTP-related costs.
Targeted revenue allocation and tax credits both serve as more
effective tools for addressing concerns about the adverse effects of
the CBDTP than blanket exemptions. These measures would allow
authorities to distribute the benefits of the CBDTP to the
communities with the greatest need and to provide relief from

227. N.Y.C. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALL., NYC CLIMATE JUSTICE AGENDA 12 (2017),
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/27269/27269.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/2CAA-JWMQ]; see Donovan Richards, New York City Must End
Environmental
Racism,
CITY
&
ST.
N.Y.
(Jan.
29,
2016),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/opinion/new-york-city-must-end-environmen
tal-racism.html [https://perma.cc/Y8SL-DK6T].
228. JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 4.
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CBDTP tolls only to those individuals for whom such relief is
essential.
CONCLUSION

New York City’s CBDTP has the potential to vastly improve
transportation equity in the region. The CBDTP can improve
horizontal equity by reducing carbon emissions and traffic congestion,
minimizing negative externalities from automobile transportation.229
These reductions will result in cleaner air, more navigable streets, and
faster travel times,230 improving life for all city residents. The
CBDTP can improve vertical equity by creating a vast new stream of
funding for the MTA.231 New revenue will allow the MTA to
upgrade the decaying infrastructure of the New York City subway,
reduce wait times, expand service, and make New York’s
transportation system more accessible for people with disabilities.232
By making transportation more affordable and accessible for the
communities that rely on it most, the MTA’s train and bus systems
can serve as an engine for economic growth and a bulwark against
socioeconomic inequality.233
Excessive provision of exemptions under the CBDTP, however,
will undermine the program’s ability to achieve these goals.234
Officials tasked with implementing the program must approach
exemptions with a critical eye. Overly broad exemptions will allow
more vehicles to enter the CBD without paying a toll, hampering the
CBDTP’s effectiveness at reducing congestion and emissions.235 By
reducing the number of paying vehicles, excessive exemptions will
force the TBTA to charge higher tolls to meet its established revenue
targets,236 impeding access to Manhattan’s CBD — and the economic
opportunities present within — for individuals without exemptions.

229. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., PRIMER, supra note 39.
230. Komanoff, The Fix NYC, supra note 42.
231. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
232. See generally METRO. TRANSP. AUTH., MTA CAPITAL PROGRAM 2020–2024
(2019)
[hereinafter
CAPITAL
PROGRAM],
https://new.mta.info/sites/default/files/2019-09/MTA%202020-2024%20Capital%20Pr
ogram%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/566X-PRYN].
233. See id.; Gillian B. White, Stranded: How America’s Failing Public
ATLANTIC
(May
16,
2015),
Transportation
Increases
Inequality,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/stranded-how-americas-failingpublic-transportation-increases-inequality/393419/ [https://perma.cc/N382-VR4R].
234. See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text.
235. Id.
236. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99.
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To determine which exemptions advance the CBDTP’s
overarching goals of revenue generation and congestion reduction,
the TMRB and TBTA should examine each requested exemption
through the lens of transportation equity. The work of Litman,
Bullock, and others, along with the two-part test defined in this Note,
offers a framework for officials to establish which exemptions
promote an equitable transportation system in which costs and
benefits are distributed fairly and progressively, and which
exemptions serve to benefit the interests of niche groups while
damaging the quality of New York’s transportation network overall.
Maintaining a transportation system that is reliable, affordable, and
accessible will be integral for ensuring New York remains a vibrant
and livable city over the coming decades,237 and the CBDTP has the
potential to serve as a key tool in doing so. Limiting exemptions
under the CBDTP to instances where these exemptions are necessary
to preserve congestion and emissions reductions and access to
transportation for low-income communities — and utilizing other,
more targeted measures to address remaining concerns about the
CBDTP’s adverse effects — will ensure the CBDTP is successful in
bringing about a more equitable transportation landscape in the New
York City region.

237. See CAPITAL PROGRAM, supra note 232.

